Strategic Voting in a Multipolarized France
Type de matériel :
TexteLangue : français Détails de publication : 2025.
Ressources en ligne : Abrégé : The shift towards a multipolar partisan system in France presents voters with a dilemma. Should they vote for the candidate of their preferred party, even if the former has little chance of success, or should they opt for a strategic vote in favor of another candidate who has a better chance of winning? In this paper, we quantify the extent to which people vote strategically in France by focusing on the 2024 legislative elections. The results show that a substantial proportion of voters found themselves in a position where they would have had incentives to cast a strategic vote: that is, at least 15% in the first round of the election and up to 40% in the second. Half of these voters took this step and voted for a candidate/party other than their preferred one. Our analyses also highlight the relevance of alliances between parties or coalitions during the inter-round period.
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The shift towards a multipolar partisan system in France presents voters with a dilemma. Should they vote for the candidate of their preferred party, even if the former has little chance of success, or should they opt for a strategic vote in favor of another candidate who has a better chance of winning? In this paper, we quantify the extent to which people vote strategically in France by focusing on the 2024 legislative elections. The results show that a substantial proportion of voters found themselves in a position where they would have had incentives to cast a strategic vote: that is, at least 15% in the first round of the election and up to 40% in the second. Half of these voters took this step and voted for a candidate/party other than their preferred one. Our analyses also highlight the relevance of alliances between parties or coalitions during the inter-round period.




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