Intention and Meaning: Does the Distinction between Intrinsic Intentionality and Derived Intentionality Still Make Sense?
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TexteLangue : français Détails de publication : 2025.
Ressources en ligne : Abrégé : If there is an intrinsic intentionality of thought, how does this intentionality give rise to the so-called “derived” intentionality of language? Faced with the impasses at stake in the rare attempts to answer this question in the analytical literature, this text proposes a contextualist articulation between thought and language. This proposal requires abandoning the principled and hierarchical distinction between the intentionality of thought and the intentionality of language; it also requires renouncing the exclusivity of the thought/language couple in order to think about meaning. Relationships between what is thought and what can be said are established within our practices.
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If there is an intrinsic intentionality of thought, how does this intentionality give rise to the so-called “derived” intentionality of language? Faced with the impasses at stake in the rare attempts to answer this question in the analytical literature, this text proposes a contextualist articulation between thought and language. This proposal requires abandoning the principled and hierarchical distinction between the intentionality of thought and the intentionality of language; it also requires renouncing the exclusivity of the thought/language couple in order to think about meaning. Relationships between what is thought and what can be said are established within our practices.
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