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The author starts from the claim Reeve argued for in Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 2002): that Aristotelian ethics is like a science. He distinguishes three ways to understand this: (1) deliberation takes the form of a scientific syllogism; (2) Aristotelian ethics is itself a science, and this interpretation can be understood in two ways: (2A) Aristotelian ethics aims at providing a scientific study of the human good; (2B) Aristotelian ethics draws its principles and norms from the Aristotelian philosophy of science; it is this latter interpretation that is considered as the most promising. Based on a strict conception of demonstration and science (demonstrated in NE VI 7), the author finally rejects the first interpretation (1). He discusses the first version of the second interpretation (2A), which he accepts with some restrictions: “The Aristotelian conception of ethics is compatible with the possibility of a true demonstrative science of ethics.” Finally, he looks at the second version, according to which the norms of ethics are taken from the Aristotelian philosophy of sciences; he focuses on the particular case of the method for establishing scientific definitions set out in the Posterior Analytics. The article leaves open, however, the specific question of which norms exactly the ethics draws from the theory of sciences.