A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Determinants in the Decision-Making Process
Type de matériel :
TexteLangue : français Détails de publication : 2008.
Ressources en ligne : Abrégé : We propose in this article some new extensions of the well-known social preferences model of Fehr and Schmidt [1999]: the introduction of opponents’ payoffs differences and a simple element of reciprocity. To test their robustness, we estimate fixed-effects Logit models with collected data on a three-player game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Results highlight a strong influence of proposed extensions that don’t display a sense of fairness but rather the self-centered concern. This new model provides a better explanation of individuals’ decisions than the pioneering model of Fehr and Schmidt. Classification JEL: C25, C72, C91, D63
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We propose in this article some new extensions of the well-known social preferences model of Fehr and Schmidt [1999]: the introduction of opponents’ payoffs differences and a simple element of reciprocity. To test their robustness, we estimate fixed-effects Logit models with collected data on a three-player game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Results highlight a strong influence of proposed extensions that don’t display a sense of fairness but rather the self-centered concern. This new model provides a better explanation of individuals’ decisions than the pioneering model of Fehr and Schmidt. Classification JEL: C25, C72, C91, D63
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