Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
Type de matériel :
TexteLangue : français Détails de publication : 2023.
Sujet(s) : Ressources en ligne : Abrégé : Aumann [1974] introduced the correlated equilibrium as a solution concept for games in strategic form. Aumann [1987] showed that if players are Bayes rational (i.e., maximize their individual expected utility with respect to their beliefs) and share a common prior, their actions follow a correlated equilibrium distribution. Various extensions of the correlated equilibrium have been proposed for games with incomplete information. This paper provides a brief account of them. JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83.
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Aumann [1974] introduced the correlated equilibrium as a solution concept for games in strategic form. Aumann [1987] showed that if players are Bayes rational (i.e., maximize their individual expected utility with respect to their beliefs) and share a common prior, their actions follow a correlated equilibrium distribution. Various extensions of the correlated equilibrium have been proposed for games with incomplete information. This paper provides a brief account of them. JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83.
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