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The distinction between normative ethics and metaethics does not necessarily imply a situation of complete independence between these two theoretical dimensions, although it does at least imply a strict separation between the types of questions at stake. However, moral constructivism seems to escape such a rule. While it is, at first glance, a normative theory, it is also very often introduced in the metaethics literature as a third way between a strong moral realism, which presupposes the existence of metaphysical properties that cannot be so easily reconciled with the natural world, and some form of moral antirealism, which can give a satisfying account of the motivational force of a moral judgment, but at the cost of its objectivity. There is, however, a largely shared skepticism—which is at least partly justified—regarding the metaethical ambition of constructivism. Indeed, it is not always very clear how constructivism—and which version—can answer the most fundamental questions of metaethics: questions of moral ontology, semantics, epistemology, or psychology. This paper presents certain paths that moral constructivism can take in order to answer these questions, and in a way that allows it to distinguish itself from both moral realism and expressivism.