Deadly ethics in imperial Japan: The refusal of Japanese soldiers to surrender
Seizelet, Éric
Deadly ethics in imperial Japan: The refusal of Japanese soldiers to surrender - 2025.
33
The promulgation of the “code of battlefield conduct” in January 1941 by the Ministry of the Army on the eve of the Pacific War famously epitomized the doctrine of no surrender in Japan: Being taken alive by the enemy was shameful, and the Japanese soldier was indoctrinated with the idea of “death rather than dishonor.” The main objective of this code was not only to forbid surrender but also to strengthen military discipline at a time when Japan was bogged down in the “China Incident” and facing the risk of an extension of the conflict in East Asia. The article focuses on the context of that promulgation and stresses that the code did not inaugurate the so-called no surrender policy, which stemmed from the warrior ideology of bushidô, reshaped by the imperial cult from the second half of the Meiji period. Even if, from a legal point of view, the military regulations did not contain any provisions concerning the status and condition of Japanese prisoners of war, this ideology was largely implemented through the training of generations of conscripts and sustained the view of the Japanese military as an indoctrinated and fanatical fighting machine. The article describes and evaluates the various communication policies adopted by the Allies to circumvent the fight-to-the-death mentality of the Japanese military, the effectiveness of which was undermined by the harsh propaganda of both sides and the brutal fighting on the ground.
Deadly ethics in imperial Japan: The refusal of Japanese soldiers to surrender - 2025.
33
The promulgation of the “code of battlefield conduct” in January 1941 by the Ministry of the Army on the eve of the Pacific War famously epitomized the doctrine of no surrender in Japan: Being taken alive by the enemy was shameful, and the Japanese soldier was indoctrinated with the idea of “death rather than dishonor.” The main objective of this code was not only to forbid surrender but also to strengthen military discipline at a time when Japan was bogged down in the “China Incident” and facing the risk of an extension of the conflict in East Asia. The article focuses on the context of that promulgation and stresses that the code did not inaugurate the so-called no surrender policy, which stemmed from the warrior ideology of bushidô, reshaped by the imperial cult from the second half of the Meiji period. Even if, from a legal point of view, the military regulations did not contain any provisions concerning the status and condition of Japanese prisoners of war, this ideology was largely implemented through the training of generations of conscripts and sustained the view of the Japanese military as an indoctrinated and fanatical fighting machine. The article describes and evaluates the various communication policies adopted by the Allies to circumvent the fight-to-the-death mentality of the Japanese military, the effectiveness of which was undermined by the harsh propaganda of both sides and the brutal fighting on the ground.
Réseaux sociaux