Certification in a Context of Uncertainty: The Case of GMOs
Granjou, Céline
Certification in a Context of Uncertainty: The Case of GMOs - 2004.
61
The credibility and guarantee attached to the certification process theoretically results from the control company’s independence and expertise. In the case of information on the GMO or non GMO nature of the food and agricultural products, these conditions are insufficient for lack of a stabilized definition of the control methods. However, professionals in the supply chain often turn to certification companies in order to ensure greater reliability for their exchanges concerning this information. Our paper analyses the way certification works in these situations. Certification companies are shown to use knowledge and agreements constructed by the actors concerned; they work on formalizing the good intentions of the certified industrialists and finally offer a guarantee on industrial practices based on their own reputation. Rather than supplying a definitive and universal conclusion to the controversy about proofs of GMO “absence”, certification companies provide a local compromise between the demands for proof from the customer companies and the investments consented by the suppliers. Resorting to certification then constitutes sufficient proof for the industrialists, a sort of conventional agreement. Certification is a private regulating mechanism which is considered sufficient, at least locally and temporarily, not to continuously endanger the necessary coordination for market exchanges: in any case it is considered more satisfactory than the one-sided intervention of public authorities.
Certification in a Context of Uncertainty: The Case of GMOs - 2004.
61
The credibility and guarantee attached to the certification process theoretically results from the control company’s independence and expertise. In the case of information on the GMO or non GMO nature of the food and agricultural products, these conditions are insufficient for lack of a stabilized definition of the control methods. However, professionals in the supply chain often turn to certification companies in order to ensure greater reliability for their exchanges concerning this information. Our paper analyses the way certification works in these situations. Certification companies are shown to use knowledge and agreements constructed by the actors concerned; they work on formalizing the good intentions of the certified industrialists and finally offer a guarantee on industrial practices based on their own reputation. Rather than supplying a definitive and universal conclusion to the controversy about proofs of GMO “absence”, certification companies provide a local compromise between the demands for proof from the customer companies and the investments consented by the suppliers. Resorting to certification then constitutes sufficient proof for the industrialists, a sort of conventional agreement. Certification is a private regulating mechanism which is considered sufficient, at least locally and temporarily, not to continuously endanger the necessary coordination for market exchanges: in any case it is considered more satisfactory than the one-sided intervention of public authorities.
Réseaux sociaux