More than a year after the Lebanese people rebelled, the power system is not giving an inch
Rizk, Sibylle
More than a year after the Lebanese people rebelled, the power system is not giving an inch - 2020.
89
In October 2019, huge popular protests challenged the Lebanese government as an unprecedented economic and financial crisis erupted due to the carelessness of the country’s rulers. The nationwide Ponzi scheme organized by the monetary authorities themselves broke down. The currency collapsed and a whole society was faced with an impoverishment that was as strong as it was brutal. More than a year later, the protest movements, which called themselves the “thawra” (revolution), are hardly visible. Even the trauma of the August 4 explosion in the port of Beirut, resulting from the same negligence on the part of public authorities, did not provoke the remobilization of collective dynamics. At the individual level, people are very angry, and the rate of emigration with no intention of returning has increased sharply despite constraints linked to COVID-19. The Lebanese political landscape seems extraordinarily frozen, while society is in full upheaval. In play is the resilience of a power system that has dressed itself up in democratic attire, but that actually functions as an oligarchy with community, confessional, militia, political, and financial components.
More than a year after the Lebanese people rebelled, the power system is not giving an inch - 2020.
89
In October 2019, huge popular protests challenged the Lebanese government as an unprecedented economic and financial crisis erupted due to the carelessness of the country’s rulers. The nationwide Ponzi scheme organized by the monetary authorities themselves broke down. The currency collapsed and a whole society was faced with an impoverishment that was as strong as it was brutal. More than a year later, the protest movements, which called themselves the “thawra” (revolution), are hardly visible. Even the trauma of the August 4 explosion in the port of Beirut, resulting from the same negligence on the part of public authorities, did not provoke the remobilization of collective dynamics. At the individual level, people are very angry, and the rate of emigration with no intention of returning has increased sharply despite constraints linked to COVID-19. The Lebanese political landscape seems extraordinarily frozen, while society is in full upheaval. In play is the resilience of a power system that has dressed itself up in democratic attire, but that actually functions as an oligarchy with community, confessional, militia, political, and financial components.
Réseaux sociaux