Price Signals and Long-Term Equilibrium: Re-Thinking Organizational Forms in Electricity Markets
Finon, Dominique
Price Signals and Long-Term Equilibrium: Re-Thinking Organizational Forms in Electricity Markets - 2013.
25
The decentralised electricity market model illustrates several market flaws in the linkage between short-term and long-term decisions. Because of highly specific problems of risk management and market incompleteness, the model does not allow effective allocation of investment in base-load and peak-load capacities leading to an optimal generation system. This makes it necessary to (1) establish regulations to provide a credible basis for remunerating generation capacity, so as to create incentives for investment in peak-load units; (2) accept vertical arrangements enabling operators to share risk with consumers, even if these arrangements constitute market imperfections that will constrain competition.
Price Signals and Long-Term Equilibrium: Re-Thinking Organizational Forms in Electricity Markets - 2013.
25
The decentralised electricity market model illustrates several market flaws in the linkage between short-term and long-term decisions. Because of highly specific problems of risk management and market incompleteness, the model does not allow effective allocation of investment in base-load and peak-load capacities leading to an optimal generation system. This makes it necessary to (1) establish regulations to provide a credible basis for remunerating generation capacity, so as to create incentives for investment in peak-load units; (2) accept vertical arrangements enabling operators to share risk with consumers, even if these arrangements constitute market imperfections that will constrain competition.
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