There are composites, thus there are simple beings. Virtue and misfortune of a Leibnizian metaphysical principle in Condillac’s work
Pécharman, Martine
There are composites, thus there are simple beings. Virtue and misfortune of a Leibnizian metaphysical principle in Condillac’s work - 2019.
35
In the series of principles to which Condillac reduces the monadological system of Leibniz in a Mémoire for Gabriel Cramer drafted in early 1747, the principle that matter contains simple beings or monads escapes criticism. Condillac grants the principle [P1] that monads are the first elements of matter. He only rejects the two subordinate principles [P2] that monads have an internal principle for all of their changes and [P3] that every passing state of a monad represents the universe from a certain point of view, which underlie the notion of unconscious perceptions. Composed in the same period, the anonymous dissertation Les Monades is completely organized with a view toward Condillac’s own demonstration of the truth of the monadological thesis that there are composites, thus there are simple beings, and its correlate, the principle that matter has simple beings as elements. A detailed analysis of the argumentative procedure deployed in Les Monades permits us to interpret this defense of the monadological thesis as a challenge by Condillac in 1747 to the heterogeneity between extension and the so-called secondary qualities that he had maintained in 1746 in the Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines. In elaborating his own proof of the truth of the monodological thesis (opposed to the one given through sufficient reason by Wolff in his Ontologia), Condillac tried to found a perfect phenomenalization of extension. The dissertation Les Monades should not be seen simply as a preliminary to the critique of abstract systems in the Traité des systèmes of 1749. The attempt at a reformed monadology in the dissertation of 1747 marks the beginning of an interrogation of the idea of extension that would be continued in the Traité des sensations of 1754.
There are composites, thus there are simple beings. Virtue and misfortune of a Leibnizian metaphysical principle in Condillac’s work - 2019.
35
In the series of principles to which Condillac reduces the monadological system of Leibniz in a Mémoire for Gabriel Cramer drafted in early 1747, the principle that matter contains simple beings or monads escapes criticism. Condillac grants the principle [P1] that monads are the first elements of matter. He only rejects the two subordinate principles [P2] that monads have an internal principle for all of their changes and [P3] that every passing state of a monad represents the universe from a certain point of view, which underlie the notion of unconscious perceptions. Composed in the same period, the anonymous dissertation Les Monades is completely organized with a view toward Condillac’s own demonstration of the truth of the monadological thesis that there are composites, thus there are simple beings, and its correlate, the principle that matter has simple beings as elements. A detailed analysis of the argumentative procedure deployed in Les Monades permits us to interpret this defense of the monadological thesis as a challenge by Condillac in 1747 to the heterogeneity between extension and the so-called secondary qualities that he had maintained in 1746 in the Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines. In elaborating his own proof of the truth of the monodological thesis (opposed to the one given through sufficient reason by Wolff in his Ontologia), Condillac tried to found a perfect phenomenalization of extension. The dissertation Les Monades should not be seen simply as a preliminary to the critique of abstract systems in the Traité des systèmes of 1749. The attempt at a reformed monadology in the dissertation of 1747 marks the beginning of an interrogation of the idea of extension that would be continued in the Traité des sensations of 1754.
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