The virility dilemma: When the emotional costs of deterrence trigger struggles for recognition
Loewener, Franca
The virility dilemma: When the emotional costs of deterrence trigger struggles for recognition - 2023.
58
It has been well established that deterrence is a double-edged sword. Many studies show that instead of preventing war, deterrence can lead to war. While the cases in which the “promise of suffering” leads to a security dilemma, and ultimately to war are well documented, the cases in which an actor attempts to deter an adversary would lead to an ontological security dilemma are not. The example of the Moroccan crises of 1905/6 and 1911 shows that threats can destabilize the sense of self of a targeted actor and lead him to seek escalation for symbolic reasons. Indeed, some actors see their self-image called into question by a dissuasive threat insofar as the constraint is equivalent to a form of domination and stigmatization causing great humiliation. This emotion being a particularly powerful motivator, it is not the material costs that dominate the calculations of the actors but the emotional costs. This is particularly valid for state decision-makers who are swayed by virile norms and values. For these actors, backing down from threats may seem more costly than risking one’s physical existence. In these cases, deterrence can turn into a struggle for recognition.
The virility dilemma: When the emotional costs of deterrence trigger struggles for recognition - 2023.
58
It has been well established that deterrence is a double-edged sword. Many studies show that instead of preventing war, deterrence can lead to war. While the cases in which the “promise of suffering” leads to a security dilemma, and ultimately to war are well documented, the cases in which an actor attempts to deter an adversary would lead to an ontological security dilemma are not. The example of the Moroccan crises of 1905/6 and 1911 shows that threats can destabilize the sense of self of a targeted actor and lead him to seek escalation for symbolic reasons. Indeed, some actors see their self-image called into question by a dissuasive threat insofar as the constraint is equivalent to a form of domination and stigmatization causing great humiliation. This emotion being a particularly powerful motivator, it is not the material costs that dominate the calculations of the actors but the emotional costs. This is particularly valid for state decision-makers who are swayed by virile norms and values. For these actors, backing down from threats may seem more costly than risking one’s physical existence. In these cases, deterrence can turn into a struggle for recognition.
Réseaux sociaux