Beveridge or Bismarck, What Consequences for the Welfare of Heterogeneous Agents?
Rossignol, Stéphane
Beveridge or Bismarck, What Consequences for the Welfare of Heterogeneous Agents? - 2003.
81
We compare the optimal insurance contribution rate and welfare levels for two opposite social insurance systems: a beveridgean one and a bismarckian one. The social contribution rates are decided by majority voting rule in both cases. In a model where agents earn heterogeneous incomes, we determine which system is preferred by which class of agents.Classification JEL: D7, H5
Beveridge or Bismarck, What Consequences for the Welfare of Heterogeneous Agents? - 2003.
81
We compare the optimal insurance contribution rate and welfare levels for two opposite social insurance systems: a beveridgean one and a bismarckian one. The social contribution rates are decided by majority voting rule in both cases. In a model where agents earn heterogeneous incomes, we determine which system is preferred by which class of agents.Classification JEL: D7, H5
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