Choosing the Legal Retirement Age under the Pressure of Unemployment
Casamatta, Georges
Choosing the Legal Retirement Age under the Pressure of Unemployment - 2012.
92
According to the general theoretical literature on pensions, in a situation of increased longevity, individuals should continue working for longer. In this paper, we will try to find out if this argument is still valid when individuals are faced with the risk of unemployment. In this context, we will examine the choice of the pay-as-you-go pension system by focusing on retirement age in a model where individuals differ only in age and are faced with the risk of unemployment. We will first outline the optimal retirement system, characterized by a contributions rate, the level of pension benefit, and retirement age and will examine the comparative statics in terms of unemployment level and longevity. Our main results are as follows. Firstly, it is optimal to vary retirement age as longevity increases. We then find that the optimal retirement age can fall when the risk of unemployment rises. We will then specify the voting equilibrium and compare it to the optimal system. We will show that the medial elector generally chooses a retirement age that is lower than the optimal, as well as a higher contribution rate.
Choosing the Legal Retirement Age under the Pressure of Unemployment - 2012.
92
According to the general theoretical literature on pensions, in a situation of increased longevity, individuals should continue working for longer. In this paper, we will try to find out if this argument is still valid when individuals are faced with the risk of unemployment. In this context, we will examine the choice of the pay-as-you-go pension system by focusing on retirement age in a model where individuals differ only in age and are faced with the risk of unemployment. We will first outline the optimal retirement system, characterized by a contributions rate, the level of pension benefit, and retirement age and will examine the comparative statics in terms of unemployment level and longevity. Our main results are as follows. Firstly, it is optimal to vary retirement age as longevity increases. We then find that the optimal retirement age can fall when the risk of unemployment rises. We will then specify the voting equilibrium and compare it to the optimal system. We will show that the medial elector generally chooses a retirement age that is lower than the optimal, as well as a higher contribution rate.
Réseaux sociaux