Reprisals and ideological-repressive logic. The turning point of the summer of 1941 in the repressive policy of the German Military Commander in France
Eismann, Gaël
Reprisals and ideological-repressive logic. The turning point of the summer of 1941 in the repressive policy of the German Military Commander in France - 2014.
64
With the invasion of the USRR by Germany in June 1941, the perception of the French resistance at the Hôtel Majestic went through significant upheavals. While assaults and assassinations of German soldiers had up until that point been generally attributed to private altercations due to the effects of alcohol, the murder of naval reserve officer Alfons Moser on August 21, 1941 in Paris was immediately identified by the MBF (Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich – Military Commander in France) as a political act, despite the absence of any material evidence permitting its establishment as such. The repressive policies of the MBF took thus a brutal turn, taking the form of the execution of hostages and then of the first deportations. Most importantly, these policies now began to principally target ideological enemies of the national-socialist regime, presumed guilty of the attacks. The MBF therefore broke with the traditional practice of taking hostages. Hostages taken in order to be shot in the case of an attack were no longer to be taken from the leaders of the community, but from the “circle of presumed guilty,” that is to say, in practice, principally communist prisoners—without completely ruling out Gaullists—even when no material proof linked them to the attacks.While the number of Jewish communists executed during this first series of executions is certainly marginal in terms of how many were actually executed, it is much less so when we remember that the Jewish population represented less than 1% of the overall number of people living in France. But more importantly, the proportion became massive as of December 1941. From then on, Jewish people were, along with communists, publicly designated by the MBF as “expiatory” victims of the resistance to the occupiers. The shift that occurred from then on, at the same moment that the Nazi genocidal project was taking form, does not signify, however, that the German repression subsequently spared the communists. Indeed, contrary to what is suggested by the communiqués issued by the MBF from late 1941, the majority—that is to say more than 90%—of Jewish prisoners shot were, like before, close to communist circles. Between convoys no. 5 and 6 of Jewish deportations for example, a “retaliation convoy” composed of around 1175 men, mostly communists, departed from Compiegne on July 6, 1942 for Auschwitz. Thus, even if the conversion of the policy of repression of the resistance into a radical anti-Semitic policy indeed took place around the end of 1941, the fact remains that it did not dissolve therein. The motivations underlying the choice taken by the MBF, supported by the local entities of the German military administration were complex and cannot be reduced to simply pragmatic and objective considerations, but neither can they be reduced to simply ideological considerations. While the MBF employed an ideologically targeted terror in occupied France, this was above all because it considered this terror less detrimental to collaboration in a country where the fight against the internal enemy was defined by the same ideological presuppositions as its own, and which were going to be consolidated, a posteriori, by the results of the police investigations. Indeed, the MBF knew that it could count on Vichy’s support, provided that the German repression principally targeted communists and Jews, sparing the majority of the population as well as the community leaders, whose designation as hostages, as was traditionally the practice, seemed incompatible with the state collaboration chosen by the French government. Thus, the singularity of the Vichy régime in occupied Europe is likely not unrelated to the more ideologically marked direction adopted by the German military apparatus of occupied France in its repressive policies. On the other hand, by counting on the anticommunism and anti-Semitism of the French population, the MBF was doubtless looking to isolate resistance fighters, designated as vulgar and cowardly criminals, from the rest of the national community. The MBF could therefore hope to frighten potential partisans of the resistance, and convince the French people that the repression only affected a certain minority of individuals, who fitted a specific political and racial profile.Whether used simply for political ends or the result of a real fear of the threat that the communist and Jewish communities represented for the occupying power, the security-related rhetoric and practices of the military occupation apparatus expressed in any case a virulent anti-Semitism and anticommunism. The vision of the resistance that underlay the often- moderate attitude adopted by the MBF in the face of large numbers of hostage executions thus derived from an ideological and racist logic.
Reprisals and ideological-repressive logic. The turning point of the summer of 1941 in the repressive policy of the German Military Commander in France - 2014.
64
With the invasion of the USRR by Germany in June 1941, the perception of the French resistance at the Hôtel Majestic went through significant upheavals. While assaults and assassinations of German soldiers had up until that point been generally attributed to private altercations due to the effects of alcohol, the murder of naval reserve officer Alfons Moser on August 21, 1941 in Paris was immediately identified by the MBF (Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich – Military Commander in France) as a political act, despite the absence of any material evidence permitting its establishment as such. The repressive policies of the MBF took thus a brutal turn, taking the form of the execution of hostages and then of the first deportations. Most importantly, these policies now began to principally target ideological enemies of the national-socialist regime, presumed guilty of the attacks. The MBF therefore broke with the traditional practice of taking hostages. Hostages taken in order to be shot in the case of an attack were no longer to be taken from the leaders of the community, but from the “circle of presumed guilty,” that is to say, in practice, principally communist prisoners—without completely ruling out Gaullists—even when no material proof linked them to the attacks.While the number of Jewish communists executed during this first series of executions is certainly marginal in terms of how many were actually executed, it is much less so when we remember that the Jewish population represented less than 1% of the overall number of people living in France. But more importantly, the proportion became massive as of December 1941. From then on, Jewish people were, along with communists, publicly designated by the MBF as “expiatory” victims of the resistance to the occupiers. The shift that occurred from then on, at the same moment that the Nazi genocidal project was taking form, does not signify, however, that the German repression subsequently spared the communists. Indeed, contrary to what is suggested by the communiqués issued by the MBF from late 1941, the majority—that is to say more than 90%—of Jewish prisoners shot were, like before, close to communist circles. Between convoys no. 5 and 6 of Jewish deportations for example, a “retaliation convoy” composed of around 1175 men, mostly communists, departed from Compiegne on July 6, 1942 for Auschwitz. Thus, even if the conversion of the policy of repression of the resistance into a radical anti-Semitic policy indeed took place around the end of 1941, the fact remains that it did not dissolve therein. The motivations underlying the choice taken by the MBF, supported by the local entities of the German military administration were complex and cannot be reduced to simply pragmatic and objective considerations, but neither can they be reduced to simply ideological considerations. While the MBF employed an ideologically targeted terror in occupied France, this was above all because it considered this terror less detrimental to collaboration in a country where the fight against the internal enemy was defined by the same ideological presuppositions as its own, and which were going to be consolidated, a posteriori, by the results of the police investigations. Indeed, the MBF knew that it could count on Vichy’s support, provided that the German repression principally targeted communists and Jews, sparing the majority of the population as well as the community leaders, whose designation as hostages, as was traditionally the practice, seemed incompatible with the state collaboration chosen by the French government. Thus, the singularity of the Vichy régime in occupied Europe is likely not unrelated to the more ideologically marked direction adopted by the German military apparatus of occupied France in its repressive policies. On the other hand, by counting on the anticommunism and anti-Semitism of the French population, the MBF was doubtless looking to isolate resistance fighters, designated as vulgar and cowardly criminals, from the rest of the national community. The MBF could therefore hope to frighten potential partisans of the resistance, and convince the French people that the repression only affected a certain minority of individuals, who fitted a specific political and racial profile.Whether used simply for political ends or the result of a real fear of the threat that the communist and Jewish communities represented for the occupying power, the security-related rhetoric and practices of the military occupation apparatus expressed in any case a virulent anti-Semitism and anticommunism. The vision of the resistance that underlay the often- moderate attitude adopted by the MBF in the face of large numbers of hostage executions thus derived from an ideological and racist logic.
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