Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein and what can only be true
Diamond, Cora
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein and what can only be true - 2022.
31
In An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Elizabeth Anscombe took it to be a fault of the Tractatus that it excluded the statement “‘Someone’ is not the name of someone,” which she took to be obviously true. It is not a bipolar proposition. I examine whether she is right that the Tractatus excludes such propositions, and I consider her example in relation to other propositions which, arguably at least, have no intelligible negation. In considering the particular case of Frege’s response to Benno Kerry about the concept « horse, » I try to develop an account of the place in Wittgenstein’s philosophy for certain sorts of proposition which do not have an intelligible negation.
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein and what can only be true - 2022.
31
In An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Elizabeth Anscombe took it to be a fault of the Tractatus that it excluded the statement “‘Someone’ is not the name of someone,” which she took to be obviously true. It is not a bipolar proposition. I examine whether she is right that the Tractatus excludes such propositions, and I consider her example in relation to other propositions which, arguably at least, have no intelligible negation. In considering the particular case of Frege’s response to Benno Kerry about the concept « horse, » I try to develop an account of the place in Wittgenstein’s philosophy for certain sorts of proposition which do not have an intelligible negation.
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