I.3. Antisémitisme : de la « passion criminelle » à « l’errance de la pensée »
Fuchs, Édith
I.3. Antisémitisme : de la « passion criminelle » à « l’errance de la pensée » - 2017.
79
Sartre showed that anti-Semitism is not an opinion protected by the democratic “freedom of opinion,” but rather a passionate criminal hatred that compels a broad existential choice, that of a passionate way of life. In contrast, Peter Trawny, in his recent effort to save Heidegger, wishes to see in Heidegger’s ingrained Nazism a “wandering” that is in keeping with his “greatness of thought,” which could not be burdened by reasons or arguments.By juxtaposing two such completely opposing views, we seek to bring to light several of the conditions under which a historical configuration such as the Nazi genocide may be addressed by philosophy.
I.3. Antisémitisme : de la « passion criminelle » à « l’errance de la pensée » - 2017.
79
Sartre showed that anti-Semitism is not an opinion protected by the democratic “freedom of opinion,” but rather a passionate criminal hatred that compels a broad existential choice, that of a passionate way of life. In contrast, Peter Trawny, in his recent effort to save Heidegger, wishes to see in Heidegger’s ingrained Nazism a “wandering” that is in keeping with his “greatness of thought,” which could not be burdened by reasons or arguments.By juxtaposing two such completely opposing views, we seek to bring to light several of the conditions under which a historical configuration such as the Nazi genocide may be addressed by philosophy.
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