Mémoire et identité dans la phénoménologie d'Edmund Husserl : liens avec les conceptions des neurosciences cognitives (notice n° 1027848)
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| control field | 20250125171656.0 |
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| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Eustache, Marie-Loup |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Mémoire et identité dans la phénoménologie d'Edmund Husserl : liens avec les conceptions des neurosciences cognitives |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2010.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 74 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | RésuméHusserl différencie le souvenir à long terme ou « ressouvenir », du souvenir à court terme, qu’il qualifie de phénomène de « rétention ». La tentative de définition de l’essence profonde de la rétention amène Husserl, par le biais de sa méthode philosophique particulière appelée phénoménologie, vers cette conscience absolue invariante présente en toute conscience. La rétention se révèle être alors, non pas un moment tout juste passé, gardé en mémoire pour qu’il y ait une saisie complète d’un objet dans le temps, mais un moyen constitutif de cette donnée en conscience. La rétention est en fait une partie de la conscience absolue et est ce qui permet à la conscience d’être consciente de quelque chose. La rétention est ce phénomène constitutif me permettant à la fois d’être conscient et de comprendre comment je suis conscient. Husserl voit deux intentionnalités de la conscience, permises par la rétention : la rétention est en fait ce point d’intersection entre mémoire à court terme et identité, entre un être en train de penser et l’être qui vit. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Memory and identity in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: links with the conceptions of cognitive neuroscienceHusserl distinguishes long-term memory or “recollection” from short-term memory, a phenomenon he calls “retention”. The attempt to define the very essence of retention leads Husserl, through its particular philosophical method known as phenomenology, to this invariant absolute consciousness present in all consciousness. Retention does not seem to be a moment just past, kept in memory so that there is a complete seizure of an object captured in time, but a way of constituting the given conscience. Retention is in fact part of the absolute consciousness and is what allows consciousness to be conscious of something without knowing it consciously builds up the meaning of the object of thought it is collecting in consciousness. Retention is the constitutive phenomenon allowing me to be both aware and understand how I am aware. Husserl sees in me two intentionalities of consciousness, permitted by retention: retention is the point of intersection between short-term memory and identity, between a being that is thinking and a being that lives. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | conscience |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | perception de perception |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | temps intime |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | rétention |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | ressouvenir |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | conscience absolue et identité |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | retention |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | identity |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | absolute consciousness |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | perception of perception |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | consciousness |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | intimate time |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | recollection |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue de neuropsychologie | Volume 2 | 2 | 2010-06-01 | p. 157-170 | 2101-6739 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-de-neuropsychologie-2010-2-page-157?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-de-neuropsychologie-2010-2-page-157?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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