Centralized vs. Decentralized Incentives in Teams: Experimental Evidence (notice n° 1063605)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01226cam a2200169 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250204124108.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Lebourges, Marc |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Centralized vs. Decentralized Incentives in Teams: Experimental Evidence |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2025.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 9 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This paper presents evidence from a laboratory experiment comparing different incentive mechanisms for team work: centralized (target-based and team tournament) and decentralized (peer-pressure), or revenue sharing, which constitutes our baseline treatment. We observe free-riding in the baseline treatment, albeit not as severe as theoretically-predicted. Peer pressure partly limits free-riding but is costly for workers. Target-based schemes lead to near-Pareto levels of effort and high firms’ profits but provide relatively lower workers’ payoffs. Finally, team tournaments generate high efforts but also high payoff inequalities among workers. JEL Codes: J33, C92. |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Masclet, David |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue économique | 75 | 5 | 2025-01-03 | p. 975-1042 | 0035-2764 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2024-5-page-975?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2024-5-page-975?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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