Do CEOs Manipulate R&D Expenses to Increase their Bonus? French Evidence (notice n° 1561849)
[ vue normale ]
| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01720cam a2200217 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20251109010613.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Di Giacomo, Alexandre |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Do CEOs Manipulate R&D Expenses to Increase their Bonus? French Evidence |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2025.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 23 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Do top executives engage in the manipulation of real activities to boost their short-term compensation? By combining hand-collected compensation data with firm-level information, we analyze the link between adjustments in research and development (R&D) expenses and bonus plans of French CEOs, focusing on the CEO’s bonus position. Utilizing panel data, we observe a negative relationship between bonus achievement levels and changes in R&D expenses. Notably, companies whose CEOs fail to meet their target bonus show lower growth in R&D expenses and are more likely to reduce such expenses. Adjustments in R&D expenses further rely on bonus criteria and occur more frequently when performance indicators underlying the bonus depend more heavily on pre-depreciation and amortization measures, which are impacted by R&D expenses. Our findings, remaining significant after robustness checks, corroborate prior research indicating that top executives manipulate earnings-based bonus plans to inflate their short-term compensation. JEL Classification: G34, M12 |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | bonus plan |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | CEO compensation |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | earnings management |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | R&D expenses |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Prinz, Enrico |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Finance | 46 | 2 | 2025-07-04 | p. 132-171 | 0752-6180 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-finance-2025-2-page-132?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-finance-2025-2-page-132?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
Pas d'exemplaire disponible.
Réseaux sociaux