Debt and Wages: The Role of Labor Regulation (notice n° 1561853)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 03371cam a2200253 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20251109010614.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | David, Thomas |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Debt and Wages: The Role of Labor Regulation |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2028.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 27 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | In this paper, we investigate how labor regulation interacts with financial leverage to explain the level of compensation firms pay to their employees. Firm leverage increases the risk of layoffs of employees and decreases their bargaining power, implying opposite effects on their pay level. Employment protection laws, however, protect employees from the risk of displacement and increase their bargaining power, thus moderating the effect of leverage on employees’ compensation. Testing this hypothesis on a large sample of OECD firms over the 1990-2018 period, we document that the correlation between leverage and employee pay is consistently lower in countries with tighter labor laws. Notably, our results hold in a stacked difference-in-difference (stacked DiD) setting exploiting major labor market reforms worldwide. Additional tests show that our results are consistent with both the risk premium and pressure effects associated with leverage. Finally, we show that strong creditor rights, a more centralized wage-bargaining process, and higher levels of unionization tend to mitigate the cross effect of leverage and employment protection laws on average employee pay. JEL Classification: G30; G32; J30 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Dans cet article, nous étudions la manière dont la rémunération des salariés est influencée par l’effet croisé de la réglementation du travail et de l’endettement financier des entreprises. La dette tend à augmenter le risque de licenciement des employés et à diminuer leur pouvoir de négociation, alors que la réglementation du travail a les effets inverses. L’hypothèse centrale de l’article est qu’un durcissement de la réglementation du travail induit un effet modérateur de la dette sur les salaires. Nous testons cette hypothèse sur un large échantillon d’entreprises de l’OCDE sur la période 1990-2018 et montrons que la corrélation entre la dette et les salaires est systématiquement plus faible dans les pays où la réglementation du travail est plus protectrice. Une méthodologie de différence de différences empilées (stacked DiD) exploitant les principales réformes du marché du travail sur notre échantillon, démontre la robustesse de nos résultats. Des tests empiriques complémentaires révèlent que nos résultats peuvent s’expliquer tant par le canal de la prime de risque que celui du pouvoir de négociation. Nous montrons aussi qu’un droit des créanciers plus fort, une centralisation plus importante de la fixation des salaires et un pouvoir plus fort des syndicats tend à diminuer l’effet joint de la dette et de la réglementation du travail sur les salaires. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Adjustment costs |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Bargaining |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Capital Structure |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Labor Laws |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Risk Premium |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Wages; Labor Market |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Moussu, Christophe |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Finance | Pub. anticipées | 2028-12-16 | p. I43-LXI | 0752-6180 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-finance-2024-0-page-I43?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-finance-2024-0-page-I43?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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