Justification des droits et neutralité métaphysique chez John Rawls (notice n° 1579995)
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| control field | 20251228050142.0 |
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| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Mbonda, Ernest-Marie |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Justification des droits et neutralité métaphysique chez John Rawls |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2009.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 98 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Une théorie de la justice peut-elle être métaphysiquement neutre? John Rawls, aussi bien dans l’article de 1985 « La théorie de la justice comme équité: une théorie politique et non pas métaphysique » que dans son Libéralisme politique (1995) a soutenu qu’une théorie de la justice qui s’applique à une société libérale démocratique ne doit s’appuyer sur aucune doctrine compréhensive, mais doit au contraire s’en tenir à des règles de la vie politique et de la répartition des biens qui soient métaphysiquement neutres. Prenant le contre-pied de la position de Rawls, cet article tente de montrer non seulement qu’une telle neutralité ne se vérifie pas dans la construction rawlsienne, lorsqu’il s’agit notamment de justifier les droits de l’homme, mais encore que cet « échec » est ce qui conserve à la théorie de Rawls toute sa force critique par rapport aux doctrines rivales comme l’utilitarisme. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Is it possible for a theory of justice to be metaphysically neutral ? John Rawls, in his paper published in 1985 and titled “Justice as Fairness: Political, not Metaphysical”, as well as in his book Political Liberalism published in 1995, defended the thesis that a theory of justice which is supposed to be applied to a liberal and democratic society should not be rooted in a comprehensive doctrine, but, on the contrary, must be confined to a formulation of rules of political conduct and repartition of goods which is metaphysically neutral. From an alternative standpoint, this paper is an attempt to show that such neutrality is not verified in Rawls’ argumentation, especially when human rights’ justification is concerned, and that this failure in implementing neutrality is what helps to preserve all the critical strength of Rawls’ theory as compared to other doctrines as utilitarianism. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Contrat |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Droits de l'homme |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Justice procédurale |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Libéralisme |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Neutralité |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Contract |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Human Rights |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Liberalism |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Neutrality |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Procedural Justice |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Archives de philosophie | 72 | 1 | 2009-04-21 | p. 101-122 | 0003-9632 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-archives-de-philosophie-2009-1-page-101?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-archives-de-philosophie-2009-1-page-101?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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