La conception kantienne de l’expérience sensible : J. McDowell et Putnam, un héritage en partage ? (notice n° 1617524)
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| control field | 20260111084400.0 |
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| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Courtillé, Juliette |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | La conception kantienne de l’expérience sensible : J. McDowell et Putnam, un héritage en partage ? |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2025.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 57 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Nous nous proposons d’étudier, pour deux raisons, les affinités que J. McDowell et Putnam entretiennent avec la conception kantienne de l’expérience sensible. D’abord, Putnam (1994) ne se réclame pas de Kant mais de J. McDowell pour rendre compte de la relation entre l’esprit et le monde. L’héritage kantien de Putnam quant à la nature et au rôle épistémique de l’expérience sensible semble ainsi d’abord venir de J. McDowell. Partant, la critique plus tardive qu’il propose de la position de J. McDowell (2012, 2016) implique de s’interroger sur la résistance de la posture kantienne à cette dernière. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | In this article, we examine the conceptual and argumentative similarities between the views of John McDowell and Hilary Putnam and Kant’s conception of sensory experience. There are two reasons for this focus of analysis: First, rather than directly invoking Kant, Putnam (1994) uses McDowell to explain the relationship between the mind and the world. Putnam’s Kantian heritage regarding the nature and epistemic role of sensory experience therefore appears to stem primarily from McDowell. Second, Putnam’s later criticisms of McDowell’s position (2012, 2016) raise questions about how resilient the Kantian stance is in the face of such critique. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | conceptualisme |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | disjonctivisme |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | expérience |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | John McDowell |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Kant |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | perception |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Putnam |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | conceptualism |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | disjunctivism |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | experience |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | John McDowell |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Kant |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | perception |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Putnam |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Archives de philosophie | 89 | 1 | 2025-12-30 | p. 33-50 | 0003-9632 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-archives-de-philosophie-2026-1-page-33?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-archives-de-philosophie-2026-1-page-33?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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