Fabio Merlini, L’Époque de la performance insignifiante, trad. de l’italien par Sabine Plaud, Paris, Le Cerf, 2011, 208 p., 23 € (notice n° 1658189)
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| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20260208010802.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Lorvellec, Yves |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Fabio Merlini, L’Époque de la performance insignifiante, trad. de l’italien par Sabine Plaud, Paris, Le Cerf, 2011, 208 p., 23 € |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2012.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 39 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | RésuméLa seule alternative au dualisme est-elle la thèse de l’identité entre états mentaux et états cérébraux ? Non, si on en croit Alva Noë ( Out of our Heads, 2009) et W. Teed Rockwell ( Neither Brain nor Ghost, 2005). Privilégiant les interactions entre cerveau, corps et environnement, ils entendent proposer une critique des fondements des neurosciences cognitives. Cependant, ni la conception énactiviste de Noë, ni la conception néopragmatiste de Rockwell n’ont les implications bouleversantes qu’elles prétendent avoir. Le conflit apparent des théories semble en outre se ramener à des différences de perspective sur la cognition, l’esprit et la conscience. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Is The Reputation of the Brain Overrated? The “Standard conception” and its OpponentsIs the claim that mental states and brain states are identical the only alternative to Cartesian dualism? Alva Noë and W. Teed Rockwell both challenge this view and elaborate a critique of the principles of cognitive neuroscience that draws on an analysis of the interactions between brain, body and the external environment. However, neither Noë’s enactivist view, nor Rockwell’s pragmatic conception do have the groundbreaking implications they are supposed to have. Moreover, the alleged conflict between these rival conceptions seems to be reducible to differences of perspective on cognition, mind and consciousness. |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger | 137 | 4 | 2012-11-28 | p. 551j-562j | 0035-3833 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-philosophique-2012-4-page-551j?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-philosophique-2012-4-page-551j?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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