National Policies for Pricing Household Waste Disposal Services in the Presence of Heterogeneous Municipal Policies (notice n° 1819945)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01866cam a2200181 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20260329002942.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Glachant, Matthieu |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | National Policies for Pricing Household Waste Disposal Services in the Presence of Heterogeneous Municipal Policies |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2005.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 49 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This article describes the situation in which municipalities are responsible for selecting the instruments for downstream pricing of household waste disposal services – incentive pricing system or flat-rate tax–while at the same time a national regulator may be in a position to impose an upstream tax on the intrinsic waste content of products. The model incorporates the possibility that households may dispose of their waste illegally in order to avoid the incentive payments. The starting point of the analysis — which is realistic — is to assume that a number of municipalities will apply inefficient flat-rate taxes. In these circumstances, what constitutes an efficient national policy as regards upstream taxation? We show that it includes an upstream tax whose rate declines as the number of municipalities adopting an incentive payment system increases. Moreover, we establish the fact that failure to allocate the total receipts of the upstream tax to the municipalities leads to a distortion of their choices regarding pricing. Finally, we show that the illegal disposal of waste poses a problem of efficiency only when the incentive payment systems have been adopted by a sufficient number of municipalities. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | pricing system |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | waste disposal |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Economie & prévision | o 167 | 1 | 2005-03-01 | p. 85-100 | 0249-4744 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-1-2005-1-page-85?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-1-2005-1-page-85?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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