Is ride-hailing doomed to monopoly? Theory and evidence from the main U.S. markets (notice n° 206843)
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| control field | 20250112052528.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Carballa Smichowski, Bruno |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Is ride-hailing doomed to monopoly? Theory and evidence from the main U.S. markets |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2018.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 19 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Cet article montre que l’irruption des plateformes numériques est en train de créer une dynamique winner-takes-all dans les marchés des VTC. On soutient que les marchés des VTC sont en train de devenir des marchés winner-takes-all pour deux raisons : la différenciation de produit n’est pas très pertinente pour créer des niches de marché et les effets de réseau indirects sont particulièrement forts dans les applis de VTC, spécialement car elles sont renforcées par l’effet « boule de neige de data » des usagers dans une plus grande mesure que dans d’autres plateformes numériques. On corrobore ce résultat en s’appuyant sur les données existantes des principales villes des États-Unis. Après avoir défini le marché pertinent des plateformes VTC, on compare les données existantes pour montrer que, comme attendu dans des marchés winner-takes-all, les parts de marché d’une seule firme (Uber) sont en train d’augment au détriment de celles de ses concurrents. Finalement, on montre que la stratégie d’Uber pour conquérir ces marchés semble être basée sur la prédation par les prix et on suggère trois manières à travers lesquelles Uber peut récupérer les pertes liées à la prédation de prix. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This paper shows that the irruption of digital platforms is creating winner-takes-all dynamics in ride-hailing markets. We argue that ride-hailing markets are becoming winner-takes-all for two reasons: product differentiation is not very relevant to carve out market niches and indirect network effects are particularly strong in ride-hailing apps, especially because they are enhanced by the user “data snowball effect” to a larger extent than in other digital platforms. We provide an empirical corroboration of these findings that builds on available data from the main cities of the United States. After defining the relevant market of ride-hailing platforms, we compare the existent data to show that, as expected in winner-takes-all markets, the market shares of a single firm (Uber) have been increasing to the detriment of its competitors’. Finally, we show that Uber’s strategy to conquer these markets seems to be based on predatory pricing and we suggest three ways in which Uber might recoup its losses from predation. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | sharing economy |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | antitrust |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Uber |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | predatory pricing |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | multisided platforms |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | ride-hailing |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | winner-takes-all |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue d'économie industrielle | o 162 | 2 | 2018-12-05 | p. 43-72 | 0154-3229 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-d-economie-industrielle-2018-2-page-43?lang=en">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-d-economie-industrielle-2018-2-page-43?lang=en</a> |
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