Fiscal or bailout union (notice n° 207764)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02108cam a2200253 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250112052801.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Dabrowski, Marek |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Fiscal or bailout union |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2014.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 2 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The European debt crisis triggered a debate on the lacking components of the EU and EMU integration architecture. Many believe that a common currency requires closer fiscal and political integration as a condition for its survival. This opinion is not necessarily supported by the experience of other monetary unions, especially those created by sovereign states. On the other hand, the current EU integration architecture already contains several elements of fiscal union. Furthermore, in several important policy areas such as financial supervision, defense, security, border protection, foreign policy, environmental protection, and climate change, the centralization of tasks and resources at the Union level could offer increasing returns to scale and a better chance to address pan-European externalities. This applies to the entire EU, not only to the Eurozone.Each variant of fiscal integration must be based on sound foundations of fiscal discipline. Market discipline, i.e., the danger of sovereign default, supplemented by clear and consistently enforced fiscal rules is the best solution to this problem. Unfortunately, since 2010, the “no bail out” principle has been replaced by a policy of conditional bailout of governments in fiscal trouble. Some proposals, such as eurobonds or the lender of last resort to governments, go even further in this direction, and threaten to build a dysfunctional fiscal union. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | fiscal union |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Eurozone |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | European Union |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | monetary union |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | fiscal discipline |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | fiscal federalism |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | common currency |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | EU budget |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue de l'OFCE | o 132 | 1 | 2014-01-01 | p. 17-49 | 1265-9576 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-de-l-ofce-2014-1-page-17?lang=en">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-de-l-ofce-2014-1-page-17?lang=en</a> |
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