Banking union: a solution to the euro zone crisis? (notice n° 208495)
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| fixed length control field | 02434cam a2200193 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250112052949.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Avaro, Maylis |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Banking union: a solution to the euro zone crisis? |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2014.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 9 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | In June 2012 European Council launched the banking union as a new project expected to contribute to solve the euro area crisis. Is banking union a necessary supplement to monetary union or a new rush forward? A banking union would break the link between the sovereign debt crisis and the banking crisis, by asking the ECB to supervise banks, by establishing common mechanisms to solve banking crises, and by encouraging banks to diversify their activities. The banking union project is based on three pillars: a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), a European Deposit Guarantee Scheme (EDGS). Each of these pillars raises specific problems. Some are related to the current crisis (can deposits in euro area countries facing difficulties be guaranteed?); some other issues are related to the EU complexity (should the banking union include all EU member states? Who will decide on banking regulations?), some other issues are related to the EU specificity (is the banking union a step towards more federalism?); the more stringent are related to structural choices regarding the European banking system. Banks’ solvency and ability to lend, would depend primarily on their capital ratios, and thus on financial markets’ sentiment. The links between the government, firms, households and domestic banks would be cut, which is questionable. Will governments be able tomorrow to intervene to influence bank lending policies, or to settle specific public banks? An opposite strategy could be promoted: restructuring the banking sector, and isolating retail banking from risky activities. Retail banks would focus on lending to domestic agents, and their solvency would be guaranteed by the interdiction to run risky activities on financial markets. Can European peoples leave such strategic choices in the hands of the ECB? |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | European construction |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | banking union |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Sterdyniak, Henri |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue de l'OFCE | o 132 | 1 | 2014-01-01 | p. 193-241 | 1265-9576 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-de-l-ofce-2014-1-page-193?lang=en">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-de-l-ofce-2014-1-page-193?lang=en</a> |
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