Le mimétisme fiscal : une application aux Régions françaises (notice n° 237078)
[ vue normale ]
000 -LEADER | |
---|---|
fixed length control field | 02403cam a2200289 4500500 |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20250112064249.0 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
Authentication code | dc |
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Feld, Lars P. |
Relator term | author |
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Le mimétisme fiscal : une application aux Régions françaises |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2002.<br/> |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | 79 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Le mimétisme fiscal a récemment fait l’objet d’une attention particulière dans l’analyse des interactions fiscales entre collectivités territoriales. Le mécanisme de ces interactions peut procéder de la possibilité qu’ont les électeurs de comparer la politique fiscale de leur gouvernement à celle menée dans les collectivités voisines et d’évaluer ainsi l’efficacité relative de leurs élus. Ce contrôle potentiel peut inciter ces derniers à s’imiter. Une telle attitude, contrairement à la compétition fiscale « en base », peut conduire à une convergence des taux d’impôt à un niveau plus élevé que le niveau efficace. Dans cet article, un modèle simple de type « concurrence par comparaison » est proposé et testé empiriquement sur les régions françaises. |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Tax Mimicking: an Application to the French Regions Yardstick competition has recently gained attention in the analysis of tax interactions among regional or local governments. Voters compare the tax policy of their government to those of neighbouring jurisdictions in order to evaluate the tax efficiency of their representatives. This may induce the latter to adopt the policy of other jurisdictions. The difference with tax competition is that ‘mimicking’may also lead to a convergence of tax rates at a level higher than the competitive one. In this paper, such a model of yardstick competition is developed and empirically tested using data for tax-setting behaviour of the French regions since the decentralisation process. |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | décentralisation |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | mimétisme fiscal |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | concurrence fiscale |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | régions françaises |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | French regions |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | tax mimicking |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | tax competition |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | decentralisation |
700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Josselin, Jean-Michel |
Relator term | author |
700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Rocaboy, Yvon |
Relator term | author |
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
Note | Économie & prévision | 156 | 5 | 2002-12-01 | p. 43-49 | 0249-4744 |
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-economie-et-prevision-1-2002-5-page-43?lang=fr">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-economie-et-prevision-1-2002-5-page-43?lang=fr</a> |
Pas d'exemplaire disponible.
Réseaux sociaux