Valeur de Shapley et répartition des dommages civils en cas de multiples co-auteurs (notice n° 237777)
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fixed length control field | 02399cam a2200277 4500500 |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20250112064423.0 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
Authentication code | dc |
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Ferey, Samuel |
Relator term | author |
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Valeur de Shapley et répartition des dommages civils en cas de multiples co-auteurs |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2015.<br/> |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | 34 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Les juridictions civiles sont souvent confrontées à la nécessité de répartir la dette de réparation d’un dommage lorsque celui-ci a été causé par plusieurs co-auteurs. Le droit manque cependant de critères clairs pour effectuer cette répartition. En modélisant le dommage causé par de multiples co-auteurs comme un jeu coopératif de partage de coût, on montre que l’on peut appliquer les solutions classiques de ce type de jeu et ainsi fournir des règles rationnelles de division des dommages. On insiste particulièrement sur la valeur de Shapley comme règle de répartition, dans la mesure où ses axiomes semblent correspondre assez étroitement aux impératifs du droit. Cette méthode présente l’avantage d’échapper aux apories logiques attribuées aux théories juridiques traditionnelles de la causalité. |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | The Shapley Value and Apportionment among Multiple Tortfeasors Courts often face the difficult problem of establishing damage causation and apportioning compensation payments among multiple tortfeasors. However, legal scholars and practitioners are still looking for a systematic apportionment method. We analyse these issues from a cooperative game perspective. The problem is modelled as a transferable utility game to which standard solution concepts can be applied. Instead of reasoning on causation, we use the traditional solution of cooperative game theory to apportion the damages due by each tortfeasor. The Shapley value is particularly suited to this legal context, as its axioms are consistent with the fundamental principles of private law. |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | répartition |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | valeur de Shapley |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | causalité juridique |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | dommages civils |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Shapley value |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | damage |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | causation |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | multiple tortfeasors |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | sharing-rule |
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
Note | Économie & prévision | 202-203 | 1 | 2015-02-09 | p. 37-52 | 0249-4744 |
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-economie-et-prevision-2013-1-page-37?lang=fr">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-economie-et-prevision-2013-1-page-37?lang=fr</a> |
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