La réforme du médecin traitant : l'émergence d'une régulation par la demande (notice n° 272348)
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| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250112081612.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Domin, Jean-Paul |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | La réforme du médecin traitant : l'émergence d'une régulation par la demande |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2008.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 39 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Ce travail s’interroge sur la capacité de la loi du 13 août 2004 portant réforme de l’assurance maladie à favoriser réellement la diminution des dépenses de santé. En effet, si la réforme prend appui principalement sur une régulation par la demande de santé, notamment via un arsenal de mesures incitatives, elle néglige toute action sur l’offre. Or, en refusant toute évolution du mode de rémunération des praticiens, la loi génère implicitement des comportements dépensiers. La politique économique de la santé aboutit donc à un résultat opposé à celui qui est escompté. Ce paradoxe est lié aux fondements théoriques de cette politique qui, en privilégiant les incitations extrinsèques, détériore les motivations intrinsèques. Il s’agit d’un effet crowding out. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Healthcare Provider Reform: The Emergence of a Demand-Based RegulationThis paper focuses on the extent to which the law of 13 August 2004 regarding health insurance reform is actually conducive to cuts in healthcare spending. Indeed, although the reform is mainly based on healthcare demand regulation – notably thanks to a raft of incentives – it does not call for any action concerning supply. Yet, by not providing for any change in practitioners’ mode of remuneration, the law implicitly generates high-spending behaviour. Healthcare economic policy thus leads to the exact opposite of the goal at which it is aimed. This paradox is due to the theoretical bases of this policy which – by favouring extrinsic incentives – deteriorates intrinsic motivations. This is a typical case of crowding out. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | effet crowding out |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | politique économique de santé |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | marché de la santé |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | crowding out effect |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | healthcare market |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | economic policy of healthcare |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Journal d'économie médicale | Volume 26 | 6 | 2008-12-01 | p. 303-315 | 0294-0736 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-journal-de-gestion-et-d-economie-medicales1-2008-6-page-303?lang=fr">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-journal-de-gestion-et-d-economie-medicales1-2008-6-page-303?lang=fr</a> |
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