La théorie de la référence de Putnam. Entre déterminants conceptuels et déterminants réels (notice n° 317796)
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| control field | 20250117235524.0 |
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| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Ehrsam, Raphaël |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | La théorie de la référence de Putnam. Entre déterminants conceptuels et déterminants réels |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2016.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 17 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | À propos de la référence, ou du contenu des états mentaux intentionnels, deux thèses de Putnam semblent dessiner des directions divergentes. Selon l’externalisme sémantique de « La signification de “signification” » (1975), la référence ou l’intentionnalité semblent devoir faire intervenir le rapport des termes et états mentaux au monde tel qu’il existe indépendamment de notre langage et de nos pensées. Dans le même temps, selon le réalisme internaliste de Raison, vérité et histoire (1981), on ne saurait penser à un objet quelconque ou y faire référence sans employer un certain réseau conceptuel et mobiliser tout un ensemble de croyances. Les deux directions sont-elles inconciliables ? Cet article soutient au contraire que leur conjonction constitue un aspect central de la pensée de Putnam, étant donné qu’elle seule permet d’éviter ce que Putnam nomme en 1999 « l’antinomie du réalisme ». |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Putnam endorses two seemingly opposite claims about reference and the content of mental states. According to Putnam’s semantic externalism in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975), reference or intentionality demands that words and mental states bear a relation to the world as it is, independently of our language and thoughts. Meanwhile, according to Putnam’s internal realism in Reason, Truth and History (1981), one cannot think about or refer to an object without making use of a certain conceptual network and entertaining a certain set of beliefs. Is the conjunction of these claims consistent? This paper argues that it is, and indeed corresponds to a core element of Putnam’s thought, since such a conjunction is the sole way to avoid what Putnam calls in 1999 “the antinomy of realism”. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Réalisme interne |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Intentionnalité |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Externalisme sémantique |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Signification |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Référence |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Vérité |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Réalisme |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Putnam |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Reference |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Internal realism |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Meaning |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Key words |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Truth |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Putnam |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Intentionalité |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Semantic externalism |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Realism |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Archives de philosophie | 79 | 4 | 2016-10-28 | p. 655-674 | 0003-9632 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-archives-de-philosophie-2016-4-page-655?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-archives-de-philosophie-2016-4-page-655?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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