Le « jugement motivé » et son intensité (notice n° 379404)
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| fixed length control field | 02197cam a2200289 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250119012137.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Barsotti, Bernard |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Le « jugement motivé » et son intensité |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2005.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 66 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Dans sa Psychologie d’un point de vue empirique (côté 1874,1911,1914-1917), Brentano a jeté les bases d’une conception intentionnelle des actes de conscience. Mais où se situe, exactement, la contribution, plus ou moins contestée, de la Psychologie à la conception phénoménologique, husserlienne, de l’intentionnalité? En suivant l’évolution des analyses brentaniennes, on découvre que son apport se confirme moins du côté de la conscience noétique, selon la vision habituelle, que du côté de l’objet intentionnel, auquel Brentano donne un tout nouveau statut ontologique en retravaillant la notion sensualiste d’intensité de la représentation en termes de motivation par le pôle-objet. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | In his Psychology from an empirical standpoint (1874,1911,1914-1917), Brentano has laid the basics for an intentional conception of the act of consciousness. But in what does exactly consist the contribution, on several occasions denied, of the Psychology to the phenomenological, husserlian conception of intentionality? Following the steps of brentanian analysis makes clear that his contribution is not on subjective side of noetic consciousness, as usually said, but on the side of intentional object, which Brentano gives a renewed meaning to throughout the reconsideration of the sensualistic idea of intensity of representation into that of motivation by the object-pole. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Objet intentionnel |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Motivation |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Intentionnalité |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Brentano |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Jugement |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Motivation |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Brentano |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Intentional object |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Judgment |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Intentionality |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Archives de philosophie | 68 | 3 | 2005-09-01 | p. 465-491 | 0003-9632 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-archives-de-philosophie-2005-3-page-465?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-archives-de-philosophie-2005-3-page-465?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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