Conspiracy theories and the paradox of epistemic individualism (notice n° 419809)
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fixed length control field | 01641cam a2200157 4500500 |
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control field | 20250119124158.0 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
Authentication code | dc |
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Guillon, Jean-Baptiste |
Relator term | author |
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Conspiracy theories and the paradox of epistemic individualism |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2019.<br/> |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | 13 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | This paper is a contribution to the litterature on the epistemology of conspiracy theories. I discuss and tackle two approaches to the phenomenon, namely the “hyper-critical” approach and the “no problem” approach. The “hyper-critical” approach says that the development of conspiracy thinking is due to a lack of “critical thinking” and, as a therapy, this approach proposes to teach pupils to trust noone and verify every bit of information. I respond that this strategy of “epistemic individualism” is inefficient and even counter-productive, because a careful study of conspiracy talk reveals that conspiracists have exactly this same individualistic epistemology. The “no problem” approach denies that there is any such problematic phenomenon as “conspiracy theories”. It relies on the difficulty to define exactly what counts as a conspiracy theory and to argue why it is (as such) epistemically problematic. I respond by providing a definition of conspiracy thinking as an overdevelopment of epistemic individualism, i.e. as the unability to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy testimonial sources. |
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
Note | Diogenes | o 261-262 | 1 | 2019-10-18 | p. 54-87 | 0419-1633 |
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-diogene-2018-1-page-54?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-diogene-2018-1-page-54?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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