Do markets work for the state ? (notice n° 489305)
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| fixed length control field | 02243cam a2200217 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121073842.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Ansaloni, Matthieu |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Do markets work for the state ? |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2017.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 67 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This special issue is centred upon a key mode of political regulation : how and why state representatives create markets when seeking to tackle a public problem. Our introduction is organized around two questions. The first deals with the generalization of this phenomenon as of the 1980s ; the second tackles the effects of this trend, notably in terms of the capacity of state representatives to impact upon economic and social regulation. Drawing upon the contributions made in the rest of this special issue, here two lines of analysis are developed. Firstly, we claim that because most of the creation of “state markets” builds upon previous bureaucratic practices, such as delegations of public authority, these instruments are not highly innovatory. Indeed, they are generally not the result of some over-arching, top-down design, but rather the progressively generated outcome of sector-specific experimentations. Secondly, we seek to go beyond overgeneral conclusions about the effects of states’ markets upon governmental influence and practice. One set of authors sees these markets as always strengthening the state through a process of “government at a distance”, whereas another instead sees these same markets as the sign of states that have given up power to economic actors. Considering that responses to this question need more empirical research, we claim instead that the effects of state markets can only be fully evaluated by taking into account the segment of the state involved and the precise types of market instruments they have respectively developed. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | political regulation |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | market |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | state |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | political instrument |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Smith, Andy |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Gouvernement et action publique | 6 | 4 | 2017-12-12 | p. 9-28 | 2260-0965 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-gouvernement-et-action-publique-2017-4-page-9?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-gouvernement-et-action-publique-2017-4-page-9?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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