Surrogate acquaintance (notice n° 510464)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01464cam a2200157 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121090842.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Halimi, Brice |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Surrogate acquaintance |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2019.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 52 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Is the acquaintance of an attribute of the same nature as that of an individual? Of course, the reduction of attributes to universals, and thus to objects, leads one to an immediate positive answer. But what about attributes in predicate positions? This article aims to argue in favor of the univocity of acquaintance, by showing that acquaintance of predicates is, despite significant differences, similar to acquaintance of individuals. To do so, the issue will be tackled from a negative angle, namely through the consideration of how, in each case, a lacking acquaintance comes to be replaced. Using an epistemic interpretation of the theory along the lines of those in Principia Mathematica that are justified for independent reasons, this perspective leads us to understand the axiom of reducibility as a principle of surrogate acquaintance for predicates, a principle whose epistemic and logical scheme is shared by Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions of individuals. |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Les Études philosophiques | o 130 | 3 | 2019-08-06 | p. 369-384 | 0014-2166 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-les-etudes-philosophiques-2019-3-page-369?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-les-etudes-philosophiques-2019-3-page-369?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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