Transparency, acquaintance, and modes of presentation (notice n° 510466)
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control field | 20250121090842.0 |
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Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
Authentication code | dc |
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Personal name | Gnassounou, Bruno |
Relator term | author |
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Transparency, acquaintance, and modes of presentation |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2019.<br/> |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | 53 |
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Summary, etc. | Neo-Russellians and neo-Fregeans both claim that some of our thoughts are irreducibly singular, because they are acquaintance-based. This relation of acquaintance imposes a condition of recognitional transparency on the objects of thought: it precludes cases in which two objects of acquaintance, A and B, are the same and yet we fail to know that A is B. To avoid this unwelcome consequence, we can either reject the presentational conception of acquaintance and replace it with a causal conception, as some neo-Russellians do, or we can keep the original notion and make it consistent with the cognitive constraints imposed by Frege’s and Campbell’s puzzles. I argue that this last option is not easily carried out, as the acquaintance constraint affects the modes of presentation themselves and forces them to fulfill two incompatible functions: the function of presenting an object, and the function of singling it out from among other objects. |
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Note | Les Études philosophiques | o 130 | 3 | 2019-08-06 | p. 385-402 | 0014-2166 |
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-les-etudes-philosophiques-2019-3-page-385?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-les-etudes-philosophiques-2019-3-page-385?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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