Napoleon and the Navy or the History of a Misunderstanding (notice n° 520801)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01226cam a2200157 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121095708.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Bernard, Arnaud |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Napoleon and the Navy or the History of a Misunderstanding |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2010.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 42 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The French navy had had barely enough time to recover from the (self-inflicted) setbacks of the Revolution, before it received two knockout blows, one at the Nile (Aboukir) and the other at Trafalgar. And Napoleon lacked the very things he needed to be able to create an effective navy, namely, time (at least ten years), money, an new officer class, simple sailors, workmen and, above all, peace. The Emperor also lacked patience, method, and an interest in innovation and new technology. The absence of a navy was to force France back into a land-centered trope from which it was not to escape for another fifty years. The British had clearly understood this when they imposed a reduced navy upon the returning Bourbons. |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Napoleonica. La Revue | o 8 | 2 | 2010-10-01 | p. 53-76 | 2100-0123 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-napoleonica-la-revue-2010-2-page-53?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-napoleonica-la-revue-2010-2-page-53?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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