Asymmetric Information in a Citizen-Candidate Model (notice n° 544789)
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fixed length control field | 00921cam a2200169 4500500 |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20250121113521.0 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
Authentication code | dc |
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Casamatta, Georges |
Relator term | author |
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Asymmetric Information in a Citizen-Candidate Model |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2002.<br/> |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | 21 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | This article proposes an extension in an asymmetric information framework of the citizen-candidates model developed by Osborne-Slivinsky [1996]. We show that introducing asymmetric information on the tastes of the agents tends to minor the prevalence of median candidates. We also show that this uncertainty leads to an increase in the number of candidates. Classification JEL: D72; D82 |
700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Zantman, Wilfried |
Relator term | author |
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
Note | Revue économique | 53 | 3 | 2002-07-01 | p. 537-544 | 0035-2764 |
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2002-3-page-537?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2002-3-page-537?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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