Market Power in Ambient Permit Market (notice n° 545248)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01077cam a2200157 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121113643.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Schwartz, Sonia |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Market Power in Ambient Permit Market |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2005.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 39 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This paper discusses market power effects in ambient permit markets. A first conclusion is that the distortion observed at the manipulated market spreads to other markets. We find that the manipulated price could be lower (higher) than his competitive level according to the dominant firm acts as a monopolist (monopsonist). We show that the efficient outcome is always reached if there are as much firms as markets, irrespective of the initial endowment of permits. If there are more firms as markets, the efficient outcome is reached only if the dominant firm receipts the optimal initial allocation. |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue économique | 56 | 3 | 2005-05-01 | p. 669-678 | 0035-2764 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2005-3-page-669?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2005-3-page-669?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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