Optimal Allocation of Pollution Quotas under Asymmetric Information (notice n° 545598)
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005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20250121113754.0 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
Authentication code | dc |
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Mougeot, Michel |
Relator term | author |
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Optimal Allocation of Pollution Quotas under Asymmetric Information |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2008.<br/> |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | 53 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | We consider, in this paper, the allocation of pollution quotas as a mechanism design problem. The first objective of pollution quotas is to reduce pollution, but raising revenue is an additional goal when taxation is distortionary. As there is a conflict between allocative efficiency and distributional concerns, rent extraction matters. We show that the level of pollution achieved under incomplete information is lower than under complete information. Each firm can receive more or less permits than under complete information. When the cost parameters are drawn from different probability distributions, the high abatement cost firms may be discriminated against. Classification JEL: Q2, D8, H2. |
700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Schwartz, Sonia |
Relator term | author |
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
Note | Revue économique | 59 | 3 | 2008-05-14 | p. 505-515 | 0035-2764 |
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2008-3-page-505?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2008-3-page-505?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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