The Conditional Effect of Natural Resources on Institutions (notice n° 546047)
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| fixed length control field | 01279cam a2200157 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121113930.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Couttenier, Mathieu |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | The Conditional Effect of Natural Resources on Institutions |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2012.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 9 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | We show empirically that natural resources do not always deteriorate the institutional quality in a country. Countries with a parliamentary systems are not affected by natural resources abundance. However, presidential systems undergo a nonlinear effect (inverse U -shaped) of natural resources on institutions. For small amounts of natural resources rents, institutions provide sufficient incentives to prevent the establishment of institutions of poor quality oriented to the extration of the rents. However, if institutions do not provide sufficient incentives, we observe an institutional quality deterioration. This effect appears only in pre sidential systems. The results still hold if we consider only a sample of democratic countries. Classification JEL: Q32, O43, O10, F10 |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue économique | 63 | 1 | 2012-01-16 | p. 27-49 | 0035-2764 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2012-1-page-27?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2012-1-page-27?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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