Environmental Agreements (notice n° 546191)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01230cam a2200169 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121114001.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Martimort, David |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Environmental Agreements |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2014.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 52 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This article proposes a perspective on international climate agreements, based on mechanism design. We exhibit a trade-off between incentives and participation. We derive a general condition under which the first-best allocation can be implemented. We then discuss how this condition is affected by the assumptions on the status quo, in particular whether a non-cooperative or a grandfathering solution prevails when the negotiation fails. We show that, when the feasibility condition is satisfied, a market-based solution can indeed implement the first best allocation. At last, when the condition does not hold, we characterize the main properties of the second-best solution. Classification JEL : Q54 ; D82 ; D62. |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Sand-Zantman, Wilfried |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue économique | 65 | 4 | 2014-06-12 | p. 481-497 | 0035-2764 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2014-4-page-481?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2014-4-page-481?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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