Environmental tax and managerial incentives in a mixed duopoly (notice n° 546307)

détails MARC
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Language code of text/sound track or separate title fre
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Authentication code dc
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Personal name Ouattara, Kadohognon Sylvain
Relator term author
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Environmental tax and managerial incentives in a mixed duopoly
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Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2018.<br/>
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General note 67
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Summary, etc. This paper examines the environmental policy of governments in a market where a semi-public firm competes with a private firm. According to the private firm nationality (domestic or foreign), we analyse the influence of strategic managerial delegation upon the pollution tax. We show that the environmental policy is more stringent with a domestic private firm. We also show that the optimal emission tax is always higher in the presence of delegation, regardless of private firm’s nationality. Finally, governments can use environmental policy as a substitute for public firm privatization. Classification JEL : L13, L33, Q58, D21.
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element partial privatization
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element environmental tax
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element mixed duopoly
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Topical term or geographic name as entry element managerial incentives
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Note Revue économique | 69 | 5 | 2018-09-06 | p. 723-744 | 0035-2764
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Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2018-5-page-723?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2018-5-page-723?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a>

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