How Prevention Challenges Monopolistic Insurance Markets: The Non-Equivalent Effects of Insurance and Self-Insurance Obligations (notice n° 546498)

détails MARC
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fixed length control field 02225cam a2200289 4500500
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20250121114119.0
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title fre
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE
Authentication code dc
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Pannequin, François
Relator term author
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title How Prevention Challenges Monopolistic Insurance Markets: The Non-Equivalent Effects of Insurance and Self-Insurance Obligations
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2024.<br/>
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE
General note 59
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. In a context of relentlessly increasing frequency of climate risks and natural disasters, public policy has no choice but to try to limit their magnitude. We extend Stiglitz’s insurance monopoly model (Stiglitz, 1977) to examine the effectiveness of three coverage schemes: the presence of self-insurance opportunities, mandatory insurance, or self-insurance. We highlight three main findings. First, the market power of an insurance monopoly is challenged by the existence of self-insurance. We show that, compared to a monopoly market with insurance alone, self-insurance opportunities threaten the insurer, reducing its market power and increasing the welfare of policyholders. Second, in this context, we find that a compulsory insurance requirement has a detrimental effect on the insured, worsening his situation and returning power to the insurer. Finally, the substitutability between insurance and self-insurance leads us to question the effects of self-insurance obligations. Our model shows that compulsory self-insurance and compulsory insurance do not have equivalent effects. While the compulsory self-insurance reduces the size of the insurer’s market, it has no effect on the welfare of the insured. The implications of these public policies are discussed. Classification JEL: D86, D42, G22
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element insurance
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element self-insurance
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element monopoly
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element public regulation
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element compulsory insurance
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element insurance
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element self-insurance
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element monopoly
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element public regulation
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN)
Topical term or geographic name as entry element compulsory insurance
700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Corcos, Anne
Relator term author
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY
Note Revue économique | 74 | 5 | 2024-01-04 | p. 739-765 | 0035-2764
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2023-5-page-739?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2023-5-page-739?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a>

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