On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly (notice n° 546820)
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| fixed length control field | 02347cam a2200205 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121114339.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Dickson, Alex |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2014.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 16 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is . Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is . The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, . When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences does not depend on B and does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.JEL classification: C72; D43; D50. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | bilateral oligopoly |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | strategic market game |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | aggregative games |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Cobb-Douglas preferences |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Recherches économiques de Louvain | 79 | 4 | 2014-02-04 | p. 89-110 | 0770-4518 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2013-4-page-89?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2013-4-page-89?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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