A Model of Adverse Promotion (notice n° 546832)
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| fixed length control field | 01723cam a2200205 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121114341.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Lecostey, Sophie |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | A Model of Adverse Promotion |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2014.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 28 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This article considers the incentivizing role of promotion. It presents a simple theoretical model where there is uncertainty among candidates for promotion as to the type of assessor mandated by the organization to evaluate them. The assessor can be of two types: those who love power or those who act ethically. We show that an adverse promotion occurs whatever the type of assessor, the term “adverse” in this context meaning unfair and/or inefficient. The unfairness is linked to the possibility of the assessor being one of those who love power. In effect, in the separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, such an assessor would promote a candidate from among the less competent in order to signal his type and induce future candidates to court favor. Inefficiency arises with both types of assessor, but is different in nature: either it is tied to courting behavior of candidates, or it is due to the discouragement of certain candidates. This article goes on to discuss the role of competition between workers and proposes different solutions to the problems that are brought to light. JEL codes: M 51. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | discouragement |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | promotion |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | taste for power |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | courting |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Recherches économiques de Louvain | 80 | 4 | 2014-12-12 | p. 7-23 | 0770-4518 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2014-4-page-7?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-recherches-economiques-de-louvain-2014-4-page-7?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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