Under the radar (notice n° 549409)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02574cam a2200229 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121115555.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Audinet, Maxime |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Under the radar |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2024.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 83 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its repercussions have catalyzed profound shifts in Russia’s foreign policy. This article examines one such shift, focusing on the evolving actors and practices within Russia’s ecosystem of information influence. We define information influence in instrumental terms, as the range of practices leveraging information resources and technologies to shape the perceptions and behaviors of a target audience, with the aim of achieving outcomes aligned with the agent’s preferences, desires, or interests. As the conflict spilled over into the global information space, Russian transnational state media outlets RT and Sputnik faced bans and deplatformization in Western countries. These sanctions prompted them to fragment their digital infrastructure, adopt more covert broadcasting strategies, and target new audiences, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. Meanwhile, the Project Lakhta—one of the most sophisticated influence operations of the past decade—was partially dismantled and absorbed by Russian intelligence services and the Ministry of Defense. This transition followed the death in August 2023 of Lakhta’s sponsor, Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner Group and a key figure among Russia’s “entrepreneurs of influence.” This restructuring has been accompanied by an intensification of covert disinformation campaigns, now increasingly outsourced to various “influence contractors” operating under Russian authorities. The RRN/Doppelgänger operation, carried out by digital marketing firms contracted by the Presidential Administration, illustrated this growing trend in Russia’s information influence. This article explores how this multifaceted ecosystem has adapted following the dramatic escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which precipitated the most severe political and security crises of the post-Soviet era. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | entrepreneurs of influence |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | information influence |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | influence contractors |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | russian foreign policy |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | transnational state media |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Gérard, Colin |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Réseaux | o 245 | 3 | 2024-09-30 | p. 113-152 | 0751-7971 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-reseaux-2024-3-page-113?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-reseaux-2024-3-page-113?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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