The Political Economy of Patents in Developing Countries: India's Policies on Drug Patents (notice n° 565607)
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| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121125547.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Guennif, Samira |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | The Political Economy of Patents in Developing Countries: India's Policies on Drug Patents |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2007.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 48 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The rationale behind the patenting of an invention can be traced to the community of interests between society and the inventor. For society, an individual can be guaranteed access to new, safe, and efficient therapies and obtain full disclosure of an invention in order to promote innovation. Meanwhile, the inventor benefits from a monopoly on the use of the product or process, and can thus recover the resources devoted to research and development. Accordingly, patents induce innovation in a sector where firms are exposed to problems of appropriation. This compromise between diverging interests was always at the heart of modifications made to patent protection in developed countries, from the granting of patents on processes alone to ensure the diffusion of innovation and the growth of a competitive pharmaceutical industry to the granting of patents to both processes and products from the 1950s onward. In the 1980s, bowing to constant pressure from the pharmaceutical industry, the term of a patent was extended to twenty years in developed countries. During the same period, we witnessed a strengthening of patent regimes around the world, and especially in developing countries, with the ratification of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994. Beginning January 1, 1996, developed countries amended their national legislation to comply with TRIPS while a twenty-year moratorium was provided for least developing countries. Meanwhile, other developing countries benefited from a ten-year moratorium, which ended in January 1, 2006, and they have amended or are amending their patent law to be in compliance with the agreement. On this occasion, there has been sharp questioning and criticism of the process, and disputes have arisen. While developing countries have constantly reminded that TRIPS is not inconsistent with the aims of industrial development and public health, there have been expressions of acute fear and strong protests from Brazil, India, and even the African group within the World Trade Organization. The flexibility provided for in the agreement has failed to reassure developing countries. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the extension of intellectual property rights (IPR) to developing countries by scrutinizing the particular pattern followed by India, which has brought about feasible industrial and health-related improvements even as it amends—gradually though belatedly—its patent law to comply with TRIPS. To better understand the challenges posed by the ratification of the TRIPS agreement in India, we will begin by establishing that opting for a stringent intellectual property regime is not without consequences since it determines the extent of the progress achieved in the industrial and health sectors, in both developed developing countries. In particular, through the implementation of a weak IPR regime in the past, India has made a substantial contribution recently to access by patients infected by HIV/AIDS to treatments through a sharp reduction in prices. We will then see how TRIPS establishes a strong IPR system that aims to reconcile the protection of innovation and the promotion of public health by providing for exceptions at the global level. Finally, after dealing in detail with Indian reticence and tardiness in making its legislation TRIPS-compliant, we will analyze the legal path followed by India in improving access to drugs. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | medicine |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | patent |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | TRIPS |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | WTO |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | India |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Chaisse, Julien |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue internationale de droit économique | XXI2 | 2 | 2007-07-01 | p. 185-210 | 1010-8831 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-internationale-de-droit-economique-2007-2-page-185?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-internationale-de-droit-economique-2007-2-page-185?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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