Public service bargains and non-partisan ministerial advisors: servants of two masters (notice n° 569760)
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| fixed length control field | 02609cam a2200205 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121131621.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Cole, Rose |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Public service bargains and non-partisan ministerial advisors: servants of two masters |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2022.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 6 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | To what extent can the public service bargain framework be applied to non-partisan ministerial advisors? Public service bargains are defined as ‘explicit or implicit agreements between public servants – the civil or uniformed services of the state – and those they serve’. The public service bargain framework has increasingly been used as an analytical tool with which to examine the elements of the bargain as experienced by various actors in different jurisdictions. The elements of the public service bargain framework are explored through the experiences of a distinct subgroup of non-partisan advisors – portfolio private secretaries – serving in the politicised environment of ministers’ offices. The minister’s office has been characterised as the ‘purple zone’ where politics (represented by the colour blue) and administration (represented by the colour red) converge to transform political will into administrative action. This qualitative research article: briefly reviews the public service bargain literature; describes the actors and setting; gives voice to their experience of the public service bargain; applies the public service bargain heuristic; and reveals new insights into how the public service bargain operates with dual principals. Points for practitionersThe public service bargain framework allows for dual principal–single agent relationships within public administration settings. Applying the public service bargain heuristic to this group of non-partisan advisors: enables a view of how the public service bargain operates at different levels (macro, meso and micro); shows that the public service bargain for these advisors has changed over time in response to administrative reforms; and demonstrates that these advisors are professionally and personally affected through the misaligned expectations of dual principals. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | partenariats |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | professionnalisme et professions |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | administration publique |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | fonction publique |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | International Review of Administrative Sciences | 88 | 3 | 2022-09-12 | p. 623-639 | 0303-965X |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-international-review-of-administrative-sciences-2022-3-page-623?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-international-review-of-administrative-sciences-2022-3-page-623?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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